Police and Justice Bill - Standing Committee D

[Mr. Greg Pope in the Chair]

Police and Justice Bill

Schedule 1 - National Policing Improvement Agency

Lynne Featherstone: I beg to move amendment No. 47, in page 51, line 30, leave out ‘objects,’.

Greg Pope: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 48, in page 51, leave out line 34.

Lynne Featherstone: These are probing amendments to find out the Government’s thinking. Why do the Government want powers to change by regulation the objects set out for the agency? The Minister said that the it would be police-owned and led, but that is hard to conceive. It will be staffed by regulation made by the Secretary of State, and the chief executive will be chosen by the Secretary of State. It all begins, as the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs (Nick Herbert) said, to sound like doublespeak.
It seems that the Secretary of State will be able to change the whole purpose of the new agency at will. Theoretically, he could take out all the objects and put in, for example, “create a national police force”. Then where would we be? While this Home Secretary seems benign—benignish—future Home Secretaries might not be so cuddly. Trust has no place in legislation. I wish the Government would come back to Parliament. The Bill seems to continue the trend that began in what we have subtitled the abolition of Parliament Act to seek continually to alter legislation by regulation.
The tripartite balance to which the Minister referred is the pillar on which we depend to protect us against over-interventionist intentions and political intervention. Police operational freedom is paramount, and the police are pretty heavily scrutinised already. To be able to change entirely the objects of the agency by regulation seems out of kilter. Can she see why some of us on Opposition Benches regard the measure as unbalancing to the tripartite structure, weighting it toward Government intervention? I look forward to her explanation why the Government wish to reserve that swingeing power, and why they do not wish to come back to Parliament to get its approval.

James Brokenshire: The hon. Lady made a strong point. The objects in paragraph 1 are already anodyne and wide in scope. It is interesting to wonder in what circumstances they would need to be altered. Paragraph 46 reserves a wide-ranging  power for the Secretary of State effectively driving a coach and horses through all the structures and protections put in place by the other parts of schedule 1. The issue must be addressed.
I am sure we shall hear some warm, cuddly, encouraging noises from the Minister about the use of the powers reserved by paragraph 46, but the provision is wide in scope. It is strange to think that the objects would need to be changed. Surely this is our opportunity—here, at the moment—to examine the objects and ensure that the scope, breadth of operation and function of the agency are as they should be. To reserve powers to restrict them or expand them even further makes our debate difficult, as we are seeking to frame the powers, the structure, the organisation and the operation of the agency. Paragraph 46 says that the whole thing can effectively be changed by the Secretary of State, after consultation with certain agencies, which affords some protection, but the paragraph also appears, on one reading, to perpetuate the view that it reserves power back to the Secretary of State. The centralisation approach is the theme that comes through from the reservation of that power.
I hope that the Minister can reassure us that that is not the intention and that protections will be afforded before that strong and stringent power is operated. I agree with the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Lynne Featherstone); I am concerned about the continued introduction of such order-making powers by way of primary rather than secondary legislation, without Parliament being able to review the situation properly. There is a need therefore for reassurance about the use of that power and the safeguards that might be put in place to ensure that it is not used aggressively. Will the Minister provide that reassurance?

Hazel Blears: I join hon. Members in welcoming you to the Chair, Mr. Pope. I was going to apologise for getting the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) mixed up this morning, but he is unfortunately not in his place. My officials have since provided me with some lovely colour photographs of all members of the Committee—it is one of the best-looking Committees on which I have had the pleasure to serve, particularly on the Government side. Hopefully there will be no more mistaken identities.
On amendment No. 47, I understand the concerns raised by the hon. Members for Hornsey and Wood Green and for Hornchurch (James Brokenshire). We want to ensure that, as far as possible, we have the opportunity to debate the objects. [Interruption.] That was quite warm and cuddly enough. The objects in paragraph (1) are fairly wide ranging, but they will not necessarily cover every eventuality for the next three, four or five years. The agency will be able to look to the future to find threats that we might face, of which we have no knowledge today. There may be circumstances in which it is necessary to make amendments.
That would not be without precedent; I understand that there is a similar provision in relation to the Police Information Technology Organisation under which  the Home Secretary can confer additional functions on, and modify PITO’s constitution as well as confer extra powers on himself. That was introduced under section 99 of the Police Reform Act 2002, but was not debated at the Committee stage. I am not sure whether we have more incisive Members on this Committee determined to hold us to account. However, at that previous stage, all members of the Committee were perfectly content with such a provision. The national policing improvement agency must be nimble, flexible, quick on its feet and able to adapt to changing circumstances.
On the point raised by hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green about Parliament having an opportunity to discuss the matter, I say that regulations will be subject to affirmative procedure and so will be fully debated in both Houses before changes can be made. The safeguards are sufficient to ensure that the objects of the national policing improvement agency will not be changed on a whim. It is important that our legislation is flexible enough to allow us to consider all eventualities, and I ask the Committee therefore to resist the amendment.

Lynne Featherstone: Having listened carefully to the Minister, I am a tiny bit reassured—I am being as generous as possible—and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: No. 2, in schedule 1, page 55, line 4, at end insert—
‘62AIn section 59 (Police Federations), after subsection (7) there is inserted—
“(7A)For the purposes of subsection (1), a member of the staff of the National Policing Improvement Agency who is—
(a)a constable, and
(b)an employee of the Agency,
shall be treated as a member of a police force in England and Wales, and references in this section to police service shall be construed accordingly.”
62BIn section 61(1) (Police Negotiating Board), before paragraph (c) there is inserted—
“(bb)the members of the staff of the National Policing Improvement Agency who are constables,”.
62C(1)Section 62 (functions of the Police Negotiating Board) is amended as follows.
(2)In subsection (1) (duty to consult Board before making regulations about certain matters), after paragraph (c) there is inserted “or
(d)regulations under paragraph 17B of Schedule 1 to the Police and Justice Act 2006 (regulations as to constables who are members of the staff of the National Policing Improvement Agency),”.
(3)Before subsection (2) there is inserted—
“(1D)Before issuing a document under paragraph 17A of Schedule 1 to the Police and Justice Act 2006 (rules and principles for contents of contracts of employment of constables employed as members of the staff of the National Policing Improvement Agency), the Secretary of State shall—
(a)consult the Police Negotiating Board for the United Kingdom about any provision in the document which relates to any of the matters mentioned in section 61(1) (other than pensions), and
(b)take into consideration any recommendation made by the Board.
(1E)Before determining the terms and conditions on which a constable is to be appointed to the staff of the National Policing Improvement Agency as an employee of the Agency, the Secretary of State (where the constable is to be appointed as the chief executive of the Agency) or the Agency (in any other case) shall—
(a)consult the Police Negotiating Board for the United Kingdom about any term or condition which relates to any of the matters mentioned in section 61(1) (other than pensions), and
(b)take into consideration any recommendation made by the Board.”
(4)In subsection (2) (arrangements under section 61(3) apply in relation to recommendations under section 62), for “subsection (1) or (1A)” there is substituted “subsection (1), (1A), (1D) or (1E)”.
62D(1)Section 63 (Police Advisory Boards) is amended as follows.
(2)Before subsection (2) there is inserted—
“(1C)The Police Advisory Board for England and Wales shall also advise the Secretary of State on general questions affecting members of the staff of the National Policing Improvement Agency who are constables.”
(3)In subsection (3) (Board to be consulted on certain regulations), after paragraph (b) there is inserted “or
(c)regulations under paragraph 17B of Schedule 1 to the Police and Justice Act 2006 (regulations as to constables who are members of the staff of the National Policing Improvement Agency), other than regulations with respect to any of the matters mentioned in section 61(1),”.
62EIn section 64 (membership of trade unions), before subsection (5) there is inserted—
“(4C)This section applies to a member of the staff of the National Policing Improvement Agency who is—
(a)a constable, and
(b)an employee of the Agency,
as it applies to a member of a police force, and references to a police force or to service in a police force shall be construed accordingly.
(4D)In its application by virtue of subsection (4C), subsection (2) shall have effect as if the reference to the chief officer of police were a reference to the chief executive of the National Policing Improvement Agency.”.’.—[Hazel Blears.]

Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 2 - Amendments to the Police Act 1996

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Nick Herbert: It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr. Pope, as it was this morning under Mr. Conway. I shall not re-introduce into our proceedings the partisan note that the Minister struck in relation to the looks of hon. Members on each side of the Committee.
This is a significant clause. It is arguably the Bill’s key clause, because it amends the Police Act 1996 so as to give the Home Secretary considerable new powers in relation to the intervention of police authorities and their appointment. The provisions come partly on the back of the Government’s proposals to amalgamate police forces, which will, they argue, create a need to reshape police authorities. They want to do that in the easiest possible way. However, there are also proposals to extend the Government’s powers to intervene in the work of police authorities that have  nothing to do with amalgamation and everything to do with the increasing use of such powers in the past few years.
We have concerns about both parts of the proposals. First, the ability of the Home Secretary to reconstitute, by order, the shape of police authorities has, rightly, been criticised by the Association of Police Authorities. It has grave concerns, considering that such sweeping provisions should not be made by delegated legislation, which will enable the Home Secretary to reshape the police authorities by order, particularly when that order is to be approved by negative resolution, as proposed under the clause.
The discomfort of many of us—at least on this side of the Committee—about the potential use of the power is increased by the way in which the Government have proceeded with regard to amalgamations. The lack of consultation on those amalgamations, the speed with which they are being progressed and the failure to take into account the objections of many police authorities to the process have contributed to our sense that once the power has been conferred on Ministers, there will be no opportunity in future to give the powers proper scrutiny, or for the House automatically to vote on them. The wholesale reorganisation of police authorities will then be possible. That is a matter of some constitutional significance, and should not be decided simply by ministerial diktat.
Later amendments seek to examine the use of the powers and to substitute the use of the positive procedure, so as to ensure that a vote will take place. Our amendments—

Greg Pope: Order. May I gently say to the hon. Gentleman that we need to debate the amendments when we reach them. At the moment, we are debating clause 2 stand part, and clause 2 is a one-line clause.

Nick Herbert: I am grateful for your advice, Mr. Pope. It is slightly problematic that the Bill has a one-line clause to bring into a force a schedule that is incredibly comprehensive and prescriptive about new powers and the amendment of existing powers to reshape police authorities and to direct them. Our dilemma is whether to oppose parts of that schedule piecemeal in order to raise our concerns, or whether, instead of having a lengthy debate on clause 2, we should have a debate on the schedule after consideration of the amendments.

Greg Pope: Order. Perhaps I can help. The best way forward is probably to hold that debate when we come to schedule 2 and the amendments thereto, rather than now.

Nick Herbert: I am happy, Mr. Pope, to accept your guidance. Rather than make a lengthy and important speech now about a one-line provision, and provided that we have the opportunity for a wide-ranging debate with the possibility of a vote on the schedule, I  am happy to conclude my remarks. My concerns about the operation of the clause and the powers that it will put in place will be considered shortly.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 9, Noes 6.

NOES

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 - Amendments to the Police Act 1996

Nick Herbert: I beg to move amendment No. 66, in schedule 2, page 59, line 9, leave out paragraph 3.

Greg Pope: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 67, in schedule 2, page 59, line 16, at end insert—
‘(a)magistrates,’.
No. 14, in schedule 2, page 59, line 17, after ‘council’ insert ‘(aa) magistrates’.
No. 68, in schedule 2, page 59, leave out lines 17 and 18 and insert
‘persons who are directly elected by members of the public’.
No. 69, in schedule 2, page 59, leave out lines 17 and 18 and insert—
‘(a)a person who is directly elected by members of the public, and
(b)other appointed persons who shall serve in an advisory capacity.’.
No. 15, in schedule 2, page 59, line 22, after ‘(a)’ insert ‘paragraph (aa)’.
No. 16, in schedule 2, page 59, line 25, at end insert—
‘(3A)The number of members of a police authority specified in subsection (3)(a) should be an odd number, equal to or greater than seventeen, specified by regulations.’.
No. 17, in schedule 2, page 59, leave out lines 26 to 40.
No. 70, in schedule 2, page 59, line 27, leave out ‘appointed’ and insert ‘directly elected’.
No. 71, in schedule 2, page 59, line 39, leave out sub-paragraph (g).
No. 18, in schedule 2, page 59, line 41, leave out from beginning of line 41 to end of line 13 on page 60.
No. 19, in schedule 2, page 60, line 14, leave out from first ‘The’ to end of line 17 and insert,
‘police authority must appoint a chairman and a vice-chairman from amongst its members, and set out—’.
No. 72, in schedule 2, page 60, line 14, leave out
‘Secretary of State may by regulations’
and insert
‘Association of Police Authorities may publish guidance’.
No. 20, in schedule 2, page 60, line 35, leave out from first ‘The’ to second ‘the’ and insert ‘police authority may decide’.
No. 21, in schedule 2, page 61, leave out lines 13 to 15 and insert—
‘(13)Regulations under this section shall not be made unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament’.
No. 73, in schedule 2, page 61, leave out lines 13 to 15 and insert—
‘(13)No regulations shall be made under this section unless a draft of them has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament’.
No. 22, in schedule 2, page 61, line 25, after ‘(3)’, insert ‘,
‘(aa)magistrates’.
No. 23, in schedule 2, page 61, line 35, after ’(a)’ insert ’, paragraph (aa)’.
No. 24, in schedule 2, page 61, line 38, at end insert—
’(4A) The number of members of a public authority specified in subsection (4)(a) should be an odd number, equal to or greater than twenty-three, specified by regulations.’.
No. 25, in schedule 2, page 61, leave out from beginning of line 39 to end of line 8 on page 62.
No. 26, in schedule 2, page 62, leave out lines 9 to 28.
No. 27, in schedule 2, page 62, line 29, leave out from first ’The’ to end of line 32 and insert
’Metropolitan Police Authority must appoint a chairman and a vice-chairman from amongst its members, and set out—’.
No. 28, in schedule 2, page 63, line 1, leave out first ‘the’ to second ‘the’ and insert ‘police authority may decide’.
No. 29, in schedule 2, page 63, leave out lines 14 to 16 and insert—
‘(11)Regulations under this section shall not be made unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.’.

Nick Herbert: This group of amendments enables me to resume some of the concerns that I set out earlier.

Michael Fabricant: From the beginning?

Nick Herbert: The Committee will be relieved to know that I am not about to start from the beginning. My previous remarks will stand.
Amendment No. 66 deals with provisions that will enable the Secretary of State, by order, to shape police authorities. I believe that the matter is of sufficient concern that we should consider striking out paragraph 3. As I said earlier, the APA has expressed concern that it will reserve too much power to the Secretary of State who, whether or not he is willing to consult on such matters, may by order and not necessarily with a vote, entirely reconstitute the basis on which police authorities are settled. Indeed, the APA has gone further by suggesting that the schedule fundamentally changes the tripartite relationship that  the Minister referred to earlier when she spoke of the need for a proper balance between police authorities, the Home Secretary and the police themselves.
The APA argues persuasively that it is not necessary for the Government to take those additional powers in order to achieve the reshaping of police authorities consequent upon police amalgamations. That can be done without the powers set out in the Bill. We Conservatives have great concerns that the larger police authorities created by amalgamation will necessarily be less representative of local communities, because the numbers of people serving on them will not, presumably, be increased in proportion with the increased population that they serve. Perhaps the Minister could deal with that.
Amendment No. 67 relates to magistrates. The schedule will remove the specific provision that exists at the moment, under the Police Act, for magistrates to have a guaranteed place on the body of police authorities. It could be that the independent members appointed to police authorities are magistrates, but it has historically been the case that magistrates form a part of police authorities. There are lots of good reasons why magistrates should be on those authorities. The APA feels quite strongly about that. Magistrates plainly bring their experience in relation to the administration of the local justice system and a guaranteed independence from political matters, which we will talk about in future. I do not understand why it is necessary to remove a reference to the place of magistrates from the Bill.
Amendments Nos. 68 and 69 are designed to tease out a debate that we had, albeit imperfectly, on Second Reading, and which I suspect will become more important as time goes by, about whether police authorities are sufficiently in touch with and known by their communities and able to respond to concerns and discharge their functions properly.
One change that has taken place, and one of the threats to the tripartite relationship that the APA has discussed, is the way in which power has increasingly been centralised on the Home Secretary, as he has taken powers to intervene in police forces and authorities, and with the establishment of the centralised bodies that we were discussing this morning. The truth is that there has been an increasing, effective political control of the police, not from the local community, but from the centre by national politicians. To a greater extent than ever before in this country, the Home Secretary now seeks to dictate the broad, strategic framework, at least, of policing and seeks to take direct measures to lift standards and interfere in the operation of police forces, just as Secretaries of State have done in relation to health care and education.

Michael Fabricant: Does my hon. Friend understand my scepticism when, for example, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport talks about the BBC. There is a direct analogy between the position of the trustees of the BBC and the police authorities, in that under the new arrangement the trustees are supposed to have local accountability, but do not include any longer, as the governors do,  representatives from Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales. How can we be convinced that, in this instance, there will be continued accountability in larger police authority areas, as my hon. Friend said earlier?

Nick Herbert: I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention, although I confess that I have lost the point of his comparison between the BBC and its trustees and members of police authorities.

Michael Fabricant: My hon. Friend was speaking about police authorities being merged into larger authorities. He said that he remains unconvinced by the Home Secretary’s assurances that there will be continued local accountability. I was drawing a parallel with similar assurances, made by the Secretary of State for the Department of Culture, Media and Sport, that under the new plan for the BBC, its trustees would be as accountable as the present governors. In fact, we know that that will not be the case because the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland governors will not be replicated as trustees in the plan given in the White Paper. Does my hon. Friend understand that point?

Nick Herbert: I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s further intervention. He made his point so brilliantly that I have little to add, other than to say that it is a further example of the danger of changing representations so that the representatives of entire communities are geographically further away. That will plainly be a real danger in relation to police amalgamation and the consequent creation of larger police authorities, as the areas will be several thousand square miles in size and police headquarters will be hundreds of miles away from local communities—and, as I said earlier, the actual number of representatives will be proportionately lower than now.

Douglas Carswell: My hon. Friend was talking about the extent to which power over policing has been centralised and responsibility moved to the centre, to the point where we now have top-down micromanagement. He said that the Home Secretary has been left with power and responsibility at the centre. Will he confirm that to, a large extent, it is not the Home Secretary who has been left with those centralised powers but the quango state, bureaucracy, the Home Office and the NPIA. If only it were the Home Secretary who had them, but the quango state is increasingly running things from the centre.

Nick Herbert: I agree that we are talking not just about the exercise of political control by the Home Secretary himself, but that it is done through a variety of bodies.

Celia Barlow: Does the hon. Gentleman agree with the hon. Member for Harwich (Mr. Carswell) that the Home Office is a quango, and will he explain why?

Nick Herbert: I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s helpful question. I do not think that my hon. Friend intended to describe the Home Office as a quango, but this morning we had a long discussion about the proliferation of such bodies. They are being set up by the Government in an attempt to lift standards of policing through centralised means. Almost by definition, the consequence of establishing bodies such as the Police Standards Unit has been a diminution in the power and role of police authorities, because those bodies are intervening directly.

Robert Flello: Perhaps I misunderstand the hon. Gentleman, but is he saying that he does not agree with the Government’s intention to raise standards?

Nick Herbert: The hon. Gentleman will be amazed to hear that I do not disagree with the intention of raising standards. We are discussing objectives that I thought were common to both sides because they would raise the standard of policing.
Public satisfaction with the police in this country has fallen markedly over the past 10 or 15 years. In fact, confidence in the police is at an all-time low. The police service is well aware of that. As the Minister should know, that is shown in every objective survey. Crime levels are a national concern, and we all want a more effective police force. I am seeking a sensible debate on what the proper balance should be between a police force that is accountable locally and one that is accountable nationally.
Historically, there has been a tripartite relationship, which I described and to which the Minister alluded this morning. As I have said, the balance has been altered, so that there is now much more central direction of policing than ever before. That is not just my view; it is expressed clearly by the Association of Police Authorities, which I am sure has sent a briefing to the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Flello). The debate is not just about making silly points about whether we are all in favour of lifting the standards of the police; of course we are.

James Brokenshire: My hon. Friend makes a strong case. He mentioned that the Association of Police Authorities has voiced its concerns. Would he go so far as to agree with it that the provisions
“represent a fundamental constitutional change”
and a
“significant shift in the balance of power within the tripartite relationship”—
the relationship that the Minister stressed was so crucial?

Nick Herbert: I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention, because he found the page in the APA briefing that I was hoping to identify. I agree with that quotation. Those concerns should be taken seriously.
There is a broader point about my amendments Nos. 68 and 69 to do with the extent to which police authorities have proper links with their local communities. One consequence of establishing police  authorities on the basis set out under the Police Act 1996, and of police authorities having appointed members, is that they are relatively invisible bodies to the general public, who have very little knowledge of them. I doubt that any ordinary member of the public could name the chairman of his or her police authority. Of course, the way in which the police are funded—they are part-financed by local people through the precept—is a mystery to people. That will only be enhanced if we get police authorities of an even larger size.
The Home Office recognised a number of those issues when it published its Green Paper in November 2003. It noted, for instance, the general consensus that the public do not have a say in decisions about policing. It mentioned research that showed that 67 per cent. of people think that
“they should have more of a say in how their local police served them.”
It also rightly stated:
“Police forces are under the ‘direction and control’ of their chief officer—not politicians.”
The first thing to say about amendments Nos. 68 and 69 is that there are no proposals to extend the political control of the police, or to compromise what should be the operational independence of the police. That is an important principle that has existed for some time. The principle that was meant to be at the heart of the tripartite relationship is that politicians should have a say about the strategic framework in which policing is conducted, but chief police officers should always remain operationally independent. It should not be possible for politicians to direct a police officer of any rank on whether to make an arrest. The police’s political independence has been compromised by centralisation in recent years, and will be further compromised by amalgamation, after which there will effectively be fewer chief constables answering to the Home Secretary. It will also be compromised by the fact that there will be not 43 police forces, but a smaller number that will be more easily managed by the Home Secretary.

Celia Barlow: Will not the establishment of basic command units mean a closer connection between communities and the police in their immediate locality? Surely, despite the amalgamation of police authorities, a smaller unit is more recognisable and answerable to local people.

Nick Herbert: I am grateful to the hon. Lady for raising a point that I have no doubt that the Minister will make, and on which the Government are now relying. The Government’s case—that its proposals will result in incredibly greater police accountability—rests on the idea that that accountability will come at the basic command unit level. All that the Bill does is to put existing basic command units on a statutory footing. There are other proposals for a community call to action, which we shall come to, but I consider that those are bureaucratic and exceptional procedures. We shall debate them in due course.
There is a big difference between observing that police forces, at the moment, are broken up into smaller units—although we must remember that the number of units has been diminishing considerably during the past few years, while basic command units have become bigger and therefore further away from people—and saying what the formal mechanism of police accountability is. What is the formal mechanism by which the chief officer is held to account?

Michael Fabricant: I am familiar with the Hove area. I was born in a village called Rottingdean, not a million miles away from Hove, and I still have a place there. Lichfield, my constituency, is in the same position with the BCUs. Is it not the case that, although BCUs are a useful innovation, they are nevertheless commanded by people who cannot make long-term strategic decisions, by virtue of their rank? It is only the chief police officer who can do that.

Nick Herbert: My hon. Friend is precisely right. However much autonomy the Government attempt to give to the commanders of basic command units, the truth is that the legal responsibility rests ultimately with the chief constable, who is accountable to the police authority. We point out that that individual, by definition, will be farther away from local people. There is an important difference between all parties’ commitment to neighbourhood policing and visibility—

Douglas Carswell: Does my hon. Friend agree that one can have as many basic command units of whatever shape and size one likes, but they will not be properly and effectively accountable locally unless one has mechanisms of direct local democratic, rather than corporatist, accountability?

Nick Herbert: I agree. That is exactly the issue that the amendments seek to probe. The local community will not have any discretion over the appointment of the local commander, whose responsibility to that community will be entirely discretionary. It will depend entirely on whether they are a good local commander. In my constituency, close to where my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield (Michael Fabricant) still has a house and to the constituency of the hon. Member for Hove (Ms Barlow)—in fact, our boundaries meet, as she knows—Sussex police have some very good commanders at BCU level. That force is committed to the extension of neighbourhood policing, and I welcome that.
Hon. Members know that matters of a certain importance—those relating fundamentally to the force’s policy and so on—are ultimately matters for the chief constable and the police authority. However good the BCU commanders’ community relations are, that is not the same as a formal mechanism for accountability. Nor is it the same as a reserve mechanism for accountability, which is what the community call for action proposes.
In recognition of the need to beef up police authorities and of the problem with the weakness of links between communities and those authorities, the Home Office, in 2003, published its Green Paper:  “Policing: Building Safer Communities Together”, in which were proposed a number of interesting options of how police authorities might be strengthened. One of those options was that police authorities should be directly elected, which it said would
“provide a direct, transparent link between communities and those charged with holding police forces to account.”
It went on to say that a related option of directly elected police boards
“would be a ‘pure’ form of local democracy—creating a direct, transparent link between communities and the police board.”
The idea of the police board appears to have gone.
The fact that the Home Office itself proposed that in a Green Paper should make hon. Members on the Government Benches at least take seriously the suggestion that the direct election of police authority members is a respectable solution for rebalancing the respective roles of central Government, local people and the police, and for enhancing police accountability. At the moment, we have a great deal of direction, but relatively little accountability.
The Minister pointed out that the responses to the consultation paper that the Home Office received were in part hostile to the idea of directly elected police authorities. Some of those responses, which are set out in the Home Office document, need to be addressed because, frankly, those are arguments that could apply to the conduct of local elections of existing district and county authorities—for as long as the Government permit those to remain in existence. They are arguments against any form of local democracy.
One of the arguments was regarding the danger of low turnouts. Are we going to scrap European elections, in which the turnout in 1999 was 24 per cent.?

Douglas Carswell: Does my hon. Friend agree that turnouts might increase if directly elected people were empowered and given a real say in local policing, because then it might be worth voting?

Nick Herbert: I am grateful to my hon. Friend because that is precisely the point that I was going to make. There is no surer way to enhance a turnout than to create a more direct and visible link between the local elector and the person or body that they are electing. At the moment, the public are unaware that police authorities are a subset almost of their existing local authorities. They have no relationship with them. The argument about low turnout is a weak one.
Concern was expressed about the cost of holding elections. I have no doubt that the cost of any election must be taken into account, but surely that cannot be a respectable reason to oppose the extension of democracy. General elections cost something under £100 million to organise, but nobody seriously suggests that that should be advanced as an argument for restricting them. There are existing costs of running police authorities and I accept that those might be higher if we had elections. However, that argument cannot be sufficient to rule out direct elections.
The interesting question was posed whether those bodies would become politicised. That is the most serious objection to my proposals for directly elected police authorities. At the very least, they are proposals that should be examined further. There is no reason why policing should be politicised, provided that the chief constable remains operationally independent. Indeed, it may be necessary to enshrine that more clearly in the provision than it is at the moment.
We already have chairmen and women in police authorities with party affiliations. Some are independent, but others are not because they are Conservative, Liberal Democrat or Labour county councillors. That is reflected throughout the country. The idea that no party politics are involved in police authorities is not correct. There are certainly additional members of police authorities with an independent background, who provide a balance. There is no reason why a directly elected individual could not be supported by a board that retains the characteristics of the appointment of responsible, independent individuals, such as magistrates.
I come now to the argument that the wearing of party political hats individuals or bodies of people who stand for election to a police authority is sufficient reason to say that such an arrangement should not be acceptable. It is hardly for us as Members of Parliament, all of whom have party affiliations, to be critical of the extension of a process at local level that may see the election of people with such affiliations.

Douglas Carswell: Does my hon. Friend agree that New York city has a directly elected individual—the mayor—who is responsible for overseeing policing, although he is not operationally responsible? Sometimes a Democrat is in charge, and at other times, a Republican, but that does not present a problem of politicisation. In fact, as a result of that direct local accountability, there has been a massive reduction in crime in New York city.

Nick Herbert: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. The success of policing in New York over the past decade, during which crime has been cut by about two thirds, is testament to the effectiveness of a model under which a powerful individual is motivated to seek better results from the police and a good police chief is appointed by that individual, but is operationally independent. The success of that style of policing in New York, which involved additional police officers being placed on the street, the CompStat model of local visibility of results and accountability and a zero-tolerance form—or broken-windows form—of policing, is well known. There is no doubt that the motivation for that came from an elected individual who had a mandate from the people to seek better performance and was able to appoint a chief officer to fulfil those public objectives. As a consequence, there may be a stronger relationship between the voters and the police in somewhere like New York than there is in our own capital city, although the Minister or someone else may have some figures that prove or disprove that assumption. Given such a big fall in crime, I imagine that public  satisfaction with the New York force has increased, whereas we know that, regrettably, it has decreased in respect of our police forces.

Martin Horwood: I have some worries about the hon. Gentleman’s extension of the democratic principle into such areas. Would he go as far as other American states and cities, and extend it to elected district attorneys and officers who are responsible for the execution of policing? That seems to be the logic of his argument.

Nick Herbert: Various models of local accountability need examining, one of which is that police authorities should be elected directly, a proposal that the Government have made. Another is that police chiefs should be accountable to existing mayors, although we have few of them. It is beyond my remit to suggest whether additional aspects of the criminal justice system could be brought under the remit of a mayor or other elected individual, but it could be argued that it would make sense to do so, because an elected individual would have a broader remit than simply governing policing. However, that is a much more fundamental change.
My argument is confined to the operation of the police. I seek to demonstrate the need to rebuild confidence in the police and the need to rebuild the link between local communities and police forces. That need will be considerably exacerbated if we have much larger forces. A form of democratic local accountability would act as a counterbalance to the increasing central control that exists under the Government. I stress that neither side proposes direct political control of the police, although I believe that the extension of central power under the Government’s current proposals will have that result.
Amendment No. 71 relates to the remuneration of police authority members. That reflects the concern of the APA, of which the Minister will be aware. The remuneration of members of the authority should not be a matter for prescription; it should be up to police authorities to decide it. The purpose of the amendment is to test that proposal.
Amendment No. 72 rejects the idea that it is right for the Secretary of State to publish regulations for the appointment of the chairman and vice-chairman of a police authority and suggests instead that if guidance is necessary, it should be published by the APA. That goes to the central argument—the extent to which the Government should interfere in matters that should be for police authorities to decide.
Amendment No. 73 is similar to some tabled by the Liberal Democrats. They would change the basis on which the constitution of police authorities should be approved from the negative procedure, which may mean no vote in Parliament, to the affirmative procedure, which would require a vote in both Houses. It is bad enough to propose constituting police authorities by secondary legislation. It gives the Minister too much reserve power, and it would be worse if the proposals were not debated.
I think that there would be greater confidence among police authorities and the APA which represents them, if we were to amend the provisions so that the affirmative procedure could be used. We could then be confident that Parliament at least had the opportunity to debate and vote on changes to the shape of police authorities.

Lynne Featherstone: In general, all the amendments go to the heart of what we believe is programme by the Government to centralise power. Police authorities are there to scrutinise the police and hold them to account. Although the public may not have a huge knowledge of police authorities, they expect them to be independent and autonomous bodies. Almost all that autonomy and independence is thrust aside in schedule 2. This is a massive power grab, and the strings are firmly attached to the Home Secretary. I reiterate to the Minister that we may not always have a Labour Home Secretary. This issue should not depend on a person; it should be to do with firm legislation, preferably in the Bill.
The amendments cover a range of constitutional arrangements that are important for autonomy and independence. They concern factors such as the number of members, qualification and disqualification, tenure of office, who appoints members, and who is in charge of police authorities. If all those matters are controlled by order of the Secretary of State, local accountability will be diminished and autonomy and independence constrained.
The most important consideration with policing and police accountability is that the public retains confidence in the whole procedure. Will the Minister tell us what lies behind the balance shift from decision making according to what is laid down in statute to making alterations by order? Why do the Government want to dictate the composition of police authorities? Why do they want to take power upwards? How have police authorities upset them? Have they been too independent? Has there not been enough control? If the answer is that some police authorities perform badly, which could be the case, surely other mechanisms could be brought into play to improve that performance and work with authorities, rather than simply saying, “We will take the power away; we will decide who is in the authorities, who chairs them, and what they can do.”
The Liberal Democrats believe that the public’s confidence in the police must be maintained and that it will be threatened if the Government perceive that the people on police authorities are Government stooges. Local understanding and knowledge make for good policing and authorities. We share the concerns of the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Association of Police Authorities and Liberty about the provisions in the Bill that have the potential substantially to blur the constitutional boundaries between the police, Parliament and the Executive. Those boundaries must be maintained, or there might be inappropriate political intervention in policing.
I move to the nitty gritty of our amendments. Amendments Nos. 14 and 22 relate to the abolition of magistrates as a specific component of the constitutional make-up of police authorities. They will still be allowed to apply as independents, but there was a specific allocation before. The balance between elected members, independents and magistrates has worked pretty well, so I want to probe the Minister regarding the thinking behind the removal of magistrates. Why have the Government decided to take against magistrates?
My experience, from five years on the Metropolitan Police Authority, is that the magistrate component adds a great deal in terms of the work load, the type of work load, and the expertise that they bring. There is a good balance between people’s representation, independent representation and informed expert representation. It is not beyond the bounds of the Metropolitan Police Service to attempt to run rings around the authority on occasion, and magistrates often bring a knowledge of the law that can be used to stop the service in its tracks.
At a time when the Government profess to be keen to join up policing and the criminal justice system, it would be beneficial to have that combination of expertise at the heart of the body to which the police are accountable. Magistrates are a valuable component part, and I am concerned that that benefit will be lost. What are the Minister’s and Home Office’s experiences of magistrates that they have decided that they should no longer be a specific, delineated component part?
Amendment Nos. 16 and 24 are probing ones to establish the Government’s intentions regarding the number of police authority members. Are the Government trying to introduce some sort of coterminousity with the proposed mergers? As the numbers decrease from 43 members—I think it was in one case—down to what will be 17, difficult decisions will need to be made. There are no safeguards because that can be done by order.
On Second Reading, I raised the political proportionality of authorities. Up to now, there has been proportionality, as with the elected member part of the authority. At the moment, the appointment of local authority members reflects the political balance in the appointing authority. Under the new proposals, I cannot see how the Government will maintain that balance. If there is room for only one member from each council or authority—presumably, and logically, a lead member responsible for, say, crime and community safety—the composition of the police authority would depend on location or geographical make-up. Had that occurred to the Minister? And what does she propose to do about political proportionality when numbers are so reduced?

Andrew Gwynne: Is the hon. Lady not aware that that is actually the case now? I declare an interest as a member of Tameside  metropolitan borough council. Greater Manchester police authority has one representative from each of the 10 district councils in Greater Manchester. There is no political balance in terms of Tameside’s representative, who is a Labour councillor because it is a Labour council. Stockport’s representative is a Liberal Democrat because that is a Liberal Democrat-controlled council. The composition of the police authority is based on the composition of the 10 district councils.

Lynne Featherstone: Perhaps I can use an example to illustrate what I am trying to say, but obviously not terribly well. A merged strategic police authority that covers Sussex, Surrey, Kent and Hampshire which might have 10 local Government members—

Stephen Pound: Labour strongholds, all?

Lynne Featherstone: Indeed. Political persuasions differ across the country.
If one member is appointed by each county council and unitary authority, on the basis of the current political position on each of the appointing authorities, the members would divide as follows: Conservatives—7, Labour—2 and Liberal Democrats—1. That compares to the political balance among the membership of the 10 authorities: Conservatives—5.8, Labour—1.7, Liberal Democrats—2.1 and others—0.4. The Conservatives and Labour would be over-represented, and the Liberal Democrats and others under-represented. That would create an unfair situation, which the original local Government legislation on proportionality as applied to police authorities was designed to avoid.

Martin Horwood: My hon. Friend made a very important point that underlines the fact that a number of different issues can come together and that the cumulative impact of some measures in the schedule is serious. I think the hon. Member for Lichfield made a similar point in relation to the BBC, although I do not particularly want him to clarify it. If the size of police authorities varies, and if the Secretary of State is able to vary the number of members, some geographical areas might be completely unrepresented in the new authorities, and political minorities, which in my area would include the Labour party, might also be unrepresented in particular areas. That has serious implications for accountability and geographical connection to the police authority.

Lynne Featherstone: I thank my hon. Friend for that helpful intervention.
Amendment No. 17 would delete subsection (4), which allows the Secretary of State to make provision by regulation for the membership of police authorities, and for qualifications, disqualification and tenure of office. We do not believe that the Secretary of State should have such broad powers, or that such provisions should be able to be changed without reference to Parliament.
The Metropolitan Police Authority is slightly different. I understand that there is a desire to increase the number of councillor members. That will change the balance, as it will result in the loss of independent members. I have experience of it, and I thought that the balance was just about right. There was a real political balance, but we also had the expertise of magistrates, whose independence was valuable. When independents applied for membership, they were examined and interviewed by the authority to discover whether they would be suitable, and they brought their particular knowledge, skills and abilities. They were not community representatives; that job was done by the elected representatives. The independents had knowledge or experience of race and community issues, police complaints, victim support and lay visitor experience, and so on. They brought a breadth of experience, so there is some concern about the increase in the number of councillor members.
Amendments Nos. 18 and 26 deal with the Secretary of State being able to appoint members of selection panels. We believe that the authority should be able to appoint its own selection panel. Tension will always be caused by the Government’s desire to ensure that authorities function well, or as they wish them to. In a sense, the Government want to be involved in those decisions, and we want them out. The tripartite balance will be damaged if they have authority and power over who sits on selection panels.
Amendments Nos. 19 and 27 deal with the provisions that give the Secretary of State the power to make regulations on the appointment of the chair and vice-chair of police authorities. That must be a job for the police authorities. Although I do not entirely agree with the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs, who made a case for directly elected police authorities—we feel they should be accountable to democratically elected bodies—it is nevertheless an unacceptable level of intervention by the Home Secretary. Those who were appointed in such a way might—heaven forfend!—be treated as a his puppets Perhaps that is the purpose; I cannot see why the Home Secretary should wish to make such appointments unless he wants those people do the Home Office’s bidding.
The Government may assert that it is their responsibility to govern, and that key people, such as the chairman, are part of it. If there is disagreement between the chairman and the police authority about objectives, the Home Secretary may issue a direction. In my view, such tension is good when holding the police to account and representing the people. I believe that the chairman and vice-chairman should be elected by the members of the police authority. As I said, autonomy and independence are paramount.
The proposals for the Metropolitan Police Authority are slightly different. The proposals in the Bill are slightly at odds with those of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, which suggests in its consultation that the Mayor of London should be the chairman. My problem with that is that being chairman of the Metropolitan Police Authority is, for lack of a better expression, one hell of a job. It is  virtually full time. However, despite the personality of the present Mayor of London, I could agree to the mayor appointing someone to be chairman. I have never wanted the mayor to be chair, because he would not be able to give it his full-time attention.
The MPA currently elects the chairman from its members. That works well, although he is a political appointee. The chairman of the MPA is a Labour man, and he has a political position—I know him well. Nevertheless, because of the construction and balance of his role as chair of the police authority, it probably works as well as it can. He was elected by the members of that authority, and therefore has a mandate to chair them. They can be a robust group when putting forward their views.

Nick Herbert: On the accountability of the Metropolitan police, does the hon. Lady agree that it is problematic that the commissioner appears to be accountable to a number of different people? He is appointed by the Home Secretary but is accountable, as she described, partly to the Mayor and partly to the Metropolitan Police authority. At a time when the position has become quite controversial, does that not throw into sharp relief the issue of who appoints or should appoint the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and, ultimately, who should take the decision whether that person remains in office?

Lynne Featherstone: The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting and timely point. If I had my choice of who was in charge of that decision, I would choose the authority, because it is most directly in touch and able to understand the daily workings. I feel that the Mayor might use it for political purposes, as might the Home Secretary. However, the police authority has a political balance, an educated view and a deep understanding on an everyday basis. I agree that the current Metropolitan Police Commissioner must answer to a plethora of bodies—three. That might be no bad thing at the moment.
Amendments Nos. 20 and 28 probe the Secretary of State’s power to make regulations concerning allowances and remunerations. I reiterate what the hon. Gentleman said: that should be the function of police authorities themselves. My experience is that they are very good at self-regulation on that matter, as they are balanced between elected members, who are not paid, and magistrate members, who receive recompense. That seems to hold a natural balance against greediness, excess or underpayment.
Amendments Nos. 21 and 22 would ensure that any regulation dealing with membership of the Metropolitan Police authority would get more parliamentary debate than the Bill currently provides for. It is unconscionable that all that should be done by order. The amendments would bring the process back into the democratically elected forum, where it could be debated publicly and a decision made publicly.

Stephen Pound: On a point of order, Mr. Pope. With regard to the specific amendments moved by the major and minor Opposition parties, will you advise the Committee whether those of us who are married to magistrates should declare an interest or recuse  ourselves from voting on the subject? As the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green just stated, there is an element of financial recompense for justices of the peace, and that may be seen as a material benefit.

Greg Pope: I am so very grateful to my hon. Friend for raising such an inventive point of order the first time I have chaired a Standing Committee. It would probably be helpful if hon. Members declared that, but it would not preclude them from participating in debate or in any Divisions that might take place.

Stephen Pound: Further to that point of order, Mr. Pope. For the record, then, I declare that I have been married since June 1976 to a member of the Ealing magistrates bench.

Douglas Carswell: I speak in favour of the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Arundel and South Downs. They are essential if the Bill is best to serve local accountability. If the amendments are made, I will support the Bill and the Government in the Division Lobby, with even more enthusiasm than I did yesterday.
People need to recognise that police authorities are not effective and that they are not working. There has been a steady erosion of the tripartite system that we have had in place since the 1960s. In fairness, that has happened under Governments of both parties. As was said, public understanding of police authorities is limited. I sometimes hear people say that. I think that they believe the public to be at fault, but it is the police authorities and the system that are at fault. The amendments tabled by my hon. Friend will go some way towards improving things.
Police authorities may be a great forum for taking a cup of tea with the chief constable, but they are hardly a harsh forum for scrutinising the actions of local police. They are not really a forum for articulating the views of local residents, who want to see more vim and vigour in the way in which their communities are policed, particularly with level one policing. I read the November 2003 Green Paper with great interest and I was optimistic. I thought that finally the ideas of localism and local accountability were no longer confined to centre right think-tanks, but were ideas that the Government were taking seriously. They spoke in the Green Paper about police boards and a bottom-up approach to local accountability. It made me very optimistic.
I am disappointed, looking at the Bill without my hon. Friend’s amendments, at how little meaningful local accountability there is. There is quite a lot of blah-blah, but nothing of substance. There is corporatist accountability, if we can call it accountability, but little of substance. My hon. Friend’s amendments would offer direct democracy, with directly elected people overseeing policing locally. They would, I believe, make the Bill well worth supporting. The idea of local democratic control over  policing used to be the preserve of the centre left. I hope we can build consensus between left and right that the amendments must be made, so that we have democratic local accountability over policing.
Other parts of the world have direct democratic control over policing. New York and Rudi Giuliani were mentioned before. People often point out that there were other factors involved—more police and zero-tolerance policing. However, the direct local accountability explains why those innovations were introduced in the first place. The amendments would introduce such locally accountable policing.
The Minister spoke about the need to avoid politicising the police. She is, in a sense, absolutely right. No one is suggesting, and I do not believe, that the amendments would in any way end the operational independence of the police. The operational independence of the police is sacrosanct, and even strengthened by the amendments. It would not be fair to characterise the amendments as ending the operational independence of the police or of politicising the police. Far from it. The question is rather whether those responsible for policing in a local community should be vulnerable at the ballot box for how they do so. At the moment they are not. Under my hon. Friend’s amendments, they would be. In a democracy, it is a legitimate matter of public policy to determine through the ballot box how a local area is policed and how it is not.

Michael Fabricant: I have been listening to my hon. Friend with considerable interest. I have been conscious of the fact that one or two local policemen in Lichfield have said that, because of the understandable criteria laid on the police—for performance in detecting criminals and so on—there is pressure on local police officers not to be seen simply on the beat or standing around. The visible presence of police officers has been deterred because of that. Does he think that, if there were greater local democracy, those views could be more clearly expressed to a chief constable, who might take a more reasoned, balanced view on spending effort and time detecting criminals, while at the same time having a police presence that might deter that criminality in the first place?

Douglas Carswell: I agree. If there were locally accountable policing, using the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Arundel and South Downs, we would start to see innovation and different approaches in different localities. We may start to see more high-visibility policing in one area, where that was felt to be appropriate, but a different approach in others. There would be a mosaic of approaches and dynamic innovation as a result of that. At the moment, without my hon. Friend’s amendment, there is more centralism and less room for innovation.

Andrew Gwynne: As a Member of Parliament for an area that has annual local elections, I do not believe that there is much desire to have another set of elections on top of those. Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that, where there is local accountability, it is with local councillors, who are approached by members of the public with concerns about crime and  disorder? Councillors have a statutory duty, through the crime and disorder reduction partnership, to work with the police and the police authority. They have a key role. The accountability should be through the local authorities and the crime and disorder reduction partnerships at the basic command unit level.

Douglas Carswell: The hon. Gentleman is not the first person to stand in this Palace and oppose the extension of more democracy. It happened in the run-up to 1832 and when people opposed the extension of the franchise to women. I am just surprised that it is we who are the progressives now. It is right and proper that we should look to extend democracy. Saying that people do not want it will be proved to be incorrect.

Nick Herbert: On the issue of whether people want it or not, is my hon. Friend aware that, in the questionnaire in the Home Office’s consultation on this matter, the option for direct elections for some seats on the police authority came out top in the views expressed by the public? Does not that demonstrate that there is an appetite for a more direct link between communities and police authorities?

Douglas Carswell: I thank my hon. Friend. That demonstrates that there is a demand. When people are allowed to vote for something—

Martin Horwood: There may be some kind of demand, but I am confused as to whether the hon. Gentleman’s party is saying that it is demanding that form of direct election. We have talked a lot about accountability to democratic bodies. I have made this point already, but I should like to ask him, since he is talking about it, whether he is advocating directly elected police constables or officers of the Crown Prosecution on the American model. Direct election to interfere in such areas goes well beyond British experience, but that seems to be the logic of the hon. Gentleman’s argument. Is he arguing for that?

Douglas Carswell: I am pleased to confirm that a policy review is under way. However, I can speak for myself. I am a localist and I am on record as saying that we should have an extension of the franchise, so that there could be directly elected police chiefs. That is my view. I am happy to speak for myself.

Nick Herbert: A policy review is under way. Directly elected police authorities was one of the options that my right hon. Friend the Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron) proposed should be considered. I remind Committee members that that option was proposed by the Government themselves.
Does not my hon. Friend agree that the intervention by the hon. Member for Cheltenham was slightly surprising, bearing in mind that the Liberal Democrats have historically regarded theirs as a party of local government and localism? Is not their apparent hostility to the extension of local empowerment in that way surprising?

Douglas Carswell: It is very surprising. A great deal of attention seems to be paid to localism, but it is interesting to see that not everybody is as converted to it as some of us are.
The Minister spoke earlier about her belief that it was proper for central Government to ensure high standards of policing. I agree; it is proper for central Government to safeguard our security, to ensure that the police enforce the law and to keep good order. However, whichever party is in power, the Government have to recognise that more centralisation does not work; it has not worked for 30 years. We need this form of local, democratic control. The tripartite system has broken down, and central Government can best ensure high standards of policing and innovation if they are prepared to let go, and allow local people a greater say. My hon. Friend’s amendments will ensure that the Bill does that.

Hazel Blears: We have had a lively and interesting debate on the membership of police authorities. I am very much in favour of giving local people more of a say about their public services, and have been of that opinion for many years as a result of my experience as a local councillor. I recognise that it is important to get the balance right. Where I take issue with Conservative Members is that they appear to be propounding a case that there is no role for central Government—despite what the hon. Member for Harwich has just said. We must ensure that the right powers are in the right place, so that the whole system works well. To abandon public services to the sort of free-for-all advocated by the hon. Member for Harwich, leads to the poorest and most vulnerable communities having the poorest public services. That was often the case in the past. Those who did not have influence and authority ended up with poor services. My Government are trying to ensure that the poorest and most vulnerable communities are able to get top-class services, particularly when it comes to policing and security. That is why we have been so successful in closing the gap between high-crime and lower-crime areas. It is a question of getting the balance right.
I turn to the large group of amendments. Amendment No. 66 seeks to remove the flexible arrangements that the Bill introduces in relation to police authority membership. I agree that the overarching framework for police authority membership should be in primary legislation. That is why we have specified in the Bill that police authorities will be made up of both councillor members and independent members, and that the former will be in the majority, because police authorities will remain as precepting authorities. It is important that there should be a democratic link, and that is why we say that local authority members will always be in the majority.
That does not mean that it is necessary to put all the detail in primary legislation. Opposition Members seem to believe that the Government are engaged in some conspiracy to take things out of the Bill and put them into regulations, so that we can then proceed in a completely hidden direction. The Committee should consider the matter a little more calmly. Many of the  provisions to decide the membership of primary care trusts or school governing bodies are enshrined in secondary legislation and regulation-making powers. That was the case long before 1997. There was no magical watershed when the Government came into power; there was no mad, centralising authority suddenly. There has been a long-standing recognition that frameworks are appropriate for primary legislation and that much of the detail should be set out under secondary legislation and subject to consultation.
Hon. Members have asked whether the regulations should be subject to affirmative resolution; at present, they are subject to negative resolution. The Committee that is considering delegated powers will take a view on such matters. If it decides that we need to take stronger action, I shall be willing to take account of that. Nothing in the Bill is markedly different from the rest of our legislation that centres on public services.
Membership of governing bodies and primary care trusts is set out in secondary legislation. I say that to refute the view of the Association of Police Authorities that the measure is a move to centralisation and an unbalancing of the tripartite relationship. I am adamant that I value the tripartite relationship. The provision does not unbalance it. The balance is in the right place. The idea that making such issues the subject of secondary legislation relates to a hidden agenda by the Government to rebalance matters is wide of the mark.

Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.

On resuming—

Michael Fabricant: Before we were so rudely interrupted by the Division, the right hon. Lady was talking about there being no surreptitious scheme or hidden agenda in having secondary legislation. I will take her word for that, but does she understand our worry that, at the same time as changes in the police force with mergers—some voluntary, some imposed—there will be changes to police authorities and their sizes? For that reason, there is a double uncertainty, first, because of secondary legislation and, secondly, because of changes in the size of police authorities.

Hazel Blears: I understand entirely the fact that, when there is change, people become unsettled. It is important to give them as much reassurance as we can. From the days of the Green Paper, the White Paper and through to the Bill, I have always said that I want to make police authorities more effective, not less effective. We need stronger governance and more accountability in the police service, not less. I believe that that should apply at every level, from the neighbourhood to the BCU, to the forces and nationally. We need a better accountability framework for policing, which has been a common theme throughout the Bill.
Police authorities currently have the duty of ensuring an effective and efficient police force. We intend to give them the responsibility of holding the chief constable to account and to make it clear that that is their specific duty. Although the detailed, technical provisions will be in secondary legislation, the thrust of the policy is to ensure that police authorities will be more effective than perhaps they have been in the past. I certainly want them to be more visible and thus more accountable to communities.
I understand that there is already power under secondary legislation to change the size of police authorities. Reference is made to that in the Police Act 1996, which was introduced by the hon. Gentleman’s own Government and which provided the ability to bring in secondary legislation.

Stephen Pound: Carswell is innocent.

Hazel Blears: I accept that the hon. Member for Harwich was not a member of that Government, but I am sure that the hon. Member for Lichfield was—and guilty, as charged.

Nick Herbert: Does the right hon. Lady accept that those provisions under the Police Act 1996 were strongly opposed by the then shadow Home Secretary, now the Prime Minister? He argued that they placed undue power in the hands of Ministers and that it should be for Parliament to decide such new changes.

Hazel Blears: That shows that we recognise change. We look for reform. We look to make sure that our public services are sensitive to changes in society. Unfortunately, Opposition Members fulfil their name of Conservative by clinging to the current position, rejecting reform and lacking the courage to enable our public services to perform to the highest standards. I am certainly not embarrassed by the fact that, unlike the Opposition, we want to be in touch with the modern world.
I come now to amendments Nos. 14, 15, 22, 23 and 67. We want to remove the separate category of magistrate members of police authorities, so that there will be sufficient space on the new police authorities for a range of independent members who have the necessary skills and competences to help police authorities to hold chief officers to account. If we continue to have separate, rigidly defined places reserved for magistrates, we will inevitably constrain and limit the number of places that are available for independents with more general skills. That does not mean for a moment that I do not absolutely value the contribution that magistrates have made to police authorities. They will still be able to apply to be independent members and continue to play a significant role on police authorities, but I do not consider that there should be a separate, defined section of magistrate members. I want to make sure that police authorities have a wide range of skills available to them.

Douglas Carswell: I have a genuine question. I am a little confused. Will the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments engage in competence-based selection for members of the police authorities and, if so, how can it be locally accountable?

Hazel Blears: That is not a role for the commissioner. I am in discussions, particularly with local government, to try to ensure not only that members of our police authorities have the necessary skills and competences, but that they are democratic representatives able to hold chief constables to account and ensure that the police service functions at the highest possible standard. That also applies to independent members.
The process of selecting independent members is fairly arcane. The authorities have to send the Home Secretary a long list and he sends them back a short list, and then they are separately organised. We have reviewed the appointments procedure for independent members, and I intend to make it simpler, less bureaucratic and more locally accountable. I also want to ensure the competence of independent members. They have a serious and important role, particularly in larger and more strategic police authorities, and I want to ensure that people have the necessary skills.

James Brokenshire: I was listening carefully to the Minister. She said that magistrates fulfilled a positive role in their membership of police authorities, but she was not willing to concede that they should automatically have a position in future. She recognises the benefits that accrued from their previous contribution, so what has changed? The value attributed to magistrates has clearly diminished. Will she explain what has changed that makes them less valued?

Hazel Blears: The answer is similar to that which I gave earlier: the authorities need to be flexible enough to meet demand in a more difficult environment. A wider range of skills is needed to manage a larger organisation with more complex responsibilities. To limit a proportion of the membership to one background would restrict our ability to draw people from a wider range of skills. However, I believe that some magistrates will want to remain involved who can exercise that broader range of skills as well as being magistrates. They will be welcome to apply as independent members.
We want input from the magistracy to continue at crime and disorder reduction partnership level. Magistrates are increasingly encouraged to become involved in them, so that when people are formulating polices to reduce crime they can draw on the local criminal justice system to ensure that the whole system functions well. That is probably an appropriate place for magistrates to become involved, as well as being independent members of a police authority.
Crime and disorder reduction partnerships will be the focus of local accountability within the new police framework. I was grateful for the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Denton and Reddish (Andrew Gwynne), who made a powerful case for the important axis of crime and disorder reduction  partnerships and borough commanders. Increasingly, that will be the local engine of policing to which people will look for accountability.
I shall deal with accountability at local level at great length at a later stage in the proceedings of the Bill, but I shall speak about it briefly now. To give the lie to the view that it is a centralising Bill, we are strengthening crime and disorder reduction partnerships. They will be subject to periodic scrutiny by local authority scrutiny committees. There will be regular face-the-public briefing sessions by the borough commander and the community safety portfolio holder.
Accountability is not all about structure; it is about facing people, looking them in the eye, reporting back to them and telling them what you have done and what you have not been able to do. That is important. It is this Government who have brought in neighbourhood policing teams, so that local people will be able to call their police officers to account at the local neighbourhood level. The community call for action will shine a light on issues of concern at local level and, for the first time, give local people a legal route to get their problems dealt with—antisocial behaviour, graffiti and all the other local worries that people have. Hon. Members may say that the Bill is about centralisation, but I entirely reject that.

Nick Herbert: The Minister has missed the point that I was making about neighbourhood policing. Getting hold of a police officer should be a given. The fact that that has not been possible is a serious problem. However, there is a fundamental difference between that and proper local accountability. If the Minister is going to rely on the crime and disorder reduction partnerships, and if they are to be the vehicle for local accountability, is she not concerned that their number might be considerably reduced? In my county, for instance, seven crime and disorder reduction partnerships will go down to one. That is surely less local accountability than before.

Hazel Blears: The hon. Gentleman will have not only a crime and disorder reduction partnership but neighbourhood policing. Perhaps the message has not yet reached him that neighbourhood policing is not simply about knowing how to get hold of a police officer. It must be underpinned by local people’s ability to set some of the priorities for the neighbourhood police team and for the team to report back. If he had been out with me yesterday or the day before in Hackney and seen its safer neighbourhood team, a scheme that is being rolled out throughout London, he would know that all those teams are underpinned by a proper mechanism for people’s input. It is not simply about being able to connect them.

James Brokenshire: Will the Minister give way?

Hazel Blears: I am anxious to make a little progress on the issues.
I come to amendments Nos. 68, 69 and 70, which deal with directly elected police authorities and sheriffs. Goodness me. The hon. Member for Harwich went a bit too far from his policy review when he spoke  about directly elected chief constables. It will be fascinating to see whether that is the position that emerges from the policy review.
As the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs said, it is not a new idea. We consulted on a range of options in our consultation paper, and the option of direct elections was almost unanimously rejected. People talked about the danger of extremist groups capturing police authorities, the potential for single-issue groups to dominate, the prospect of short-term policing decisions being made in the run-up to election periods and the potential for politicisation.
I feel strongly that directly elected police authorities would reinforce to some extent the silo approach to tackling problems of crime and disorder. We have tried in the community safety plan and in making the connection with crime and disorder reduction partnerships to recognise that many of the crime and disorder problems that communities face cannot be solved simply by policing. The best way to do it is to have a partnership dealing with social services, education, housing and the health service as well as policing. Simply having directly elected police authorities could reinforce that silo mentality, which would not be to the benefit of communities at all.
When the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) was the shadow Home Secretary, he said about the possibility of directly elected authorities:
“I reject entirely the view ... that there should be directly elected police authorities. That would be a recipe for politicising the police service.”—[Official Report, 26 April 1994; Vol. 242, c. 112-3.]
Perhaps the Opposition have moved full circle in their approach to the matter.
The amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs are short on detail. I am not sure how his commissioners would be elected, how long their term of office would be or what the voter system would be—

Nick Herbert: Do it all by order.

Hazel Blears: I wonder whether that would be a negative or an affirmative resolution. It is fascinating to think about.
I endorse wholeheartedly the wish for strong accountability, but I do not feel that direct elections are the answer. We must ensure that police authorities work closely with their local authority colleagues and with the crime and disorder reduction partnerships. By that time, I think that we will have sufficient levers in the system to achieve that.
The hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green has raised concerns about the number of people on police authorities. The Government have already said that the larger, more strategic police authorities would have 23 members. That is in excess of the minimum of 17 that applies now. I am keen to ensure that all top-tier local authority areas have at least one seat on the police authority. In Wales, for example, that would  mean having 43 people on the police authority. We could do that for a transitional period—perhaps two years—and look to a reduction after that.
We must get the balance between sufficient representation and authorities that are not so large as to be incapable of reaching decisions and being managed properly. We are trying to accommodate political balances. The hon. Lady raised the issue of political balance. We are trying as much we can in the framework to achieve that as well.
Amendments Nos. 20, 28 and 71 mention the payment of allowances and police authorities’ ability to determine them. The Government have no intention of changing that approach, but we need to ensure that it is set out in the regulations. Police authorities should still make that kind of decision. I feel that they should also be able to choose their own organisational chairs and vice-chairs, and I can give the hon. Lady an assurance on those points. It would not be right for that choice to be imposed on them.
I hope that some of the amendments were probing amendments. I was rather concerned that amendments Nos. 19, 27 and 72, which are about appointing chairs, could lead to a plethora of arrangements in different police authorities about how to take those steps. Although I want the police authorities to have that responsibility, there should be some consistency. One of the problems in the police service is that we sometimes have 43 ways of doing everything. The more consistency that we can get into the process, the better.
Amendment No. 72 suggests that we should sort out our appointments and election procedures by seeking guidance from the Association of Police Authorities. It is not right to have such guidance from a non-statutory body; it is better to set out the procedure in regulations, with the assurance that we want the police authorities to take such decisions themselves.
We have set a minimum of 23 members, which I hope is reassuring, and I have spoken about parliamentary scrutiny. We will consider what the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee says about how extensive that scrutiny should be. The provisions for health and education are subject to negative resolution, so we are not out of alignment with them.
I am not sure what amendments Nos. 17, 18, 25 and 26 are designed to achieve. They remove the illustrative lists of the matters to be covered by regulations, and I do not understand the purpose of that. Those lists are helpful. They give an indication of the sort of areas that we want to cover, and I intend to use the new regulation-making power to simplify the complex and somewhat bureaucratic procedures for appointing independent members to police authorities.
I hope that I have reassured hon. Members that this is not a sinister plot by the Government inappropriately to impose decisions that should be taken by police authorities. I am determined to ensure that police authorities exercise their roles more effectively, that the larger, more strategic police  authorities have good, rigorous governance and that the people on those authorities have the necessary skills and competences. The hon. Member for Harwich said that in his experience police authorities are not very good at their jobs. I do not know how many police authority chairs he has met. I have met a range of chairs and members, and I can tell him that they are excellent. They have good skills and competences and do a fine job. That is not universally the case, but I have been very impressed by the work that some have done, and I do not recognise the picture that he paints.
Finally, let me say to the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs, who said that public confidence in the police service is at an all-time low and going down, and that it is a dreadful state of affairs, that last year there was a significant rise in confidence in local policing. Satisfaction with the overall service is high—at 78.5 per cent. nationally. Most public services and private sector organisations would give their eye-teeth to have a 78.5 per cent. public satisfaction rating. We are trying to ensure that they do even better, but they have a fine record, certainly over the past few years, of having used the record investment that they have been given by this Government to provide communities with greatly improved services.

Nick Herbert: In response to the Minister’s last point, I do not have the figures to hand, but there has been a pronounced decline in public confidence in our policing over the past decade or so. It is possible to construct opinion polls in all sorts of ways, but I should have thought that she recognised that public confidence has been an issue, partly as a result of the withdrawal of the kind of neighbourhood and community-based policing that she wants to see as much as we do on the Conservative Benches. We make a mistake if we are complacent about the  disconnection that has begun to happen between the police and the communities that they wish to serve, but perhaps we should debate that another time.
I am grateful for the Minister’s point that the order-making procedures in the schedule will be scrutinised elsewhere, and for her undertaking that, if prompted, she will consider whether they are sufficiently robust. Changing that procedure to the affirmative resolution procedure, so that there could be a vote in the House on these measures would go a long way to allaying our concerns about how the order-making powers might be used in the construction of police authorities. We look forward to further developments.
The wider debate that we had about the direct election of police authorities was not satisfactory. I hope that we will return to those issues in the context of community call for action at a later stage in the Bill and in relation to the debate on the crime and disorder reduction partnerships.
The Minister suggests that we do not understand what neighbourhood policing means. Actually, I think that it is the reverse; I do not think that she is properly setting out the difference between neighbourhood policing—the availability of police officers to be contacted at the local level—and formal mechanisms of accountability. Those are fundamentally different things, as I have tried to point out during these proceedings.
Nevertheless, we have already voted against clause 2 standing part of the Bill, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Further consideration adjourned.—[Joan Ryan.]

Adjourned accordingly at six minutes past Three o’clock till Tuesday 21 March at half-past Ten o’clock.